

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 04253 01 OF 02 051717Z

46

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

DRC-01 /153 W

----- 101613

R 051620Z AUG 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7045

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4253

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: WORKING GROUP CHAIRMAN'S DRAFT ON IMPLICATIONS
OF REVISED DATA: AIR FORCE MANPOWER

REF: A) USNATO 4236; B) USNATO 4240; C) USNATO 4140

1. WORKING GROUP ACTING CHAIRMAN HAS CIRCULATED DRAFT PAPER ON AIR
FORCE MANPOWER, WHICH FOLLOWS AT END OF THIS MESSAGE, IN LIGHT OF
SPC JULY 15 REQUEST FOR WG EXAMINATION
OF MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEW NATO AND WP DATA. THIS
DRAFT PAPER THUS COMPLEMENTS TWO OTHER DRAFT PAPERS, ON ANOMALIES
AND IMPLICATIONS (REFTELS A & B). DRAFT PAPER IS ALSO RELEVANT
TO AHG'S REQUEST FOR NAC GUIDANCE (REFTEL C, PARAS 4, 10, 11).

2. ACTION REQUESTED: MISSION WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON GUIDANCE
ON GENERAL THRUST OF DRAFT PAPER, AND COMMENTS ON IT.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04253 01 OF 02 051717Z

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MBFR - IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENTS
OF NATO AND WP FORCES MANPOWER IN THE NGA AS OF MID-1974

- AIR FORCES -

INTRODUCTION

1. THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED(1) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENTS(2) AT MID-1974 OF NATO AND WP FORCES' MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. THESE INCLUDE ESTIMATES, NOT HITHERTO AVAILABLE, OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTHS: THESE ARE SHOWN AT ANNEX A.

2. THE WORKING GROUP ARE CONSIDERING, SEPARATELY, THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED GROUND FORCE FIGURES(3); AND OF THE POSSIBILITIES(4) FOR ADJUSTMENT OF CERTAIN ANOMALIES BETWEEN THE MANNING PRACTICES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, DESIGNED TO INDUCE THE WP POWERS TO AGREE ON THE RANGE OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS.

3. THIS NOTE IS CONCERNED ONLY WITH THE AIR MANPOWER: BUT SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THOSE QUOTED ABOVE.

THE SITUATION

4. THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL(5) STATES THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL HAVE, HITHERTO, EXCLUDED OTHER FORCES (AIR AND NUCLEAR) FROM CONSIDERATION IN MBFR. NO FIRM ALLIANCE POSITION HAS BEEN TAKEN AS TO THE EVENTUAL INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS.

5. THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA HS SUGGESTED(6) THAT THE ALLIES CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT AIR FORCE MANPOWER SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THIS PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN FORMALLY CONSIDERED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THUS FAR(7).

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04253 01 OF 02 051717Z

(1) AC/119-R(74)69

(2) AC/276-D(74)6

(3) AGV(74)55 (SITCEN 1903 DTG 191540Z UL)

(4) AGV(74)54 (SITCEN 1902 DTG 191035Z JUL)

(5) NAC 2948 220945Z NOV 73 (SEE PO/73/154 20 NOV 73)

(6) AHG REPORT TO NAC 5 APR 74 (US NATO/POL/OUT/NS-74-47, 8 APR 74)

(7) ISD/70(FINAL)

THE PROBLEMS TO BE CONSIDERED

6. THE ISSUES REQUIRING EXAMINATION FROM THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL

VIEWPOINT ARE:

A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTRODUCING AIR FORCE ELEMENTS INTO THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS.

B. THE SPECIFIC POINT RAISED BY THE AD HOC GROUP - THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUDING AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

REVIEW

7. BECAUSE OF THE ALLIANCE POSITION THAT MBFR SHOULD FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ALLIANCE STUDIES AND CONSULTATION TO DATE HAVE CONCENTRATED ON THE EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS IN THOSE GROUND FORCES: AND ALLIANCE NEGOTIATORS HAVE SOUGHT TO BRING THE WP POWERS TO NEGOTIATE ON THAT BASIS.

8. THE CAPABILITIES AND STRENGTHS OF NATO TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN HYPOTHEITICAL REDUCTIONS IN THESE TACTICAL AIR FORCES, HAVE BEEN EXAMINED(1), AT EXPERT/MILITARY STAFF LEVEL. THESE STUDIES HAVE NOT ADDRESSED NUCLEAR ASPECTS. THE FINDINGS OF THAT EXAMINATION ARE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT YET ADDRESSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCES, NOR ASSESSED THE RISK IN SUCH REDUCTIONS (EXCEPT FOR ONE MIXED PACKAGE POSSIBILITY). THE EXPERT/TECHNICAL LEVEL REPORT(1) MENTIONED ABOVE, WHEN FINALISED, WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR SUCH CONSULTATION.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04253 01 OF 02 051717Z

(1) AC/276(SGTA-N/32(FINAL DRAFT))

AIR MANPOWER AND THE COMMON CEILING

9. THE AIR MANPOWER ASSESSMENTS OF THE NATO AND WP FORCES IN THE NGA ARE SHOWN AT ANNEX A. THESE ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL IN NUMBERS. THEY SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE TAKEN AS INDICATORS OF COMBAT CAPABILITY.

THE STRUCTURES OF THE OPPOSING AIR FORCES VARY WIDELY. THE NATO AIR FORCES INCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF AIRMEN EMPLOYED ON GROUND-TO-AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS (29,000) AND SSMS (3,700). THE WP AIR FORCES ARE LESS SELF-CONTAINED THAN THE NATO AIR FORCES, DRAWING HEAVILY ON ARMY SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES. THE RELATIVE AIRCRAFT STRENGTHS ARE THEREFORE SHOWN AT ANNEX 2 (TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY) TO BRING THE COMPARISON INTO PERSPECTIVE.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04253 02 OF 02 051728Z

46

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

DRC-01 /153 W

----- 101711

R 051620Z AUG 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7046

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4253

10. THE EXISTING AIR FORCE MANPOWER, FOR NATO (196,000) AND THE PACT (208,500) COULD BE ADDED TO ANY POSTULATED COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES WITHOUT ADDRESSING AIR FORCES FOR REDUCTIONS. THIS WOULD BE A TRANSPARENT COSMETIC PROCEDURE. ALTERNATIVELY, GROUND AND AIR FORCES COULD BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY, BUT BOTH WITHIN THE CONCEPTS OF A TARGET OF APPROXIMATE PARITY. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE COULD BE A FORCE LIMITATION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER LINKED WITH A SEPARATE APPROACH TO A COMMON CEILING TARGET FOR GROUND FORCES.

11. IF THE AIR MANPOWER FIGURES WERE TO BE INCLUDED IN FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS IN ANY SENSE OTHER THAN A COSMETIC APPROACH, THE EFFECT WOULD BE TO PLACE A CEILING ON AIR MANPOWER, LOWER THAN THE PRESENT CEILING. SUCH AN APPROACH, BASED ON MANPOWER, NEED NOT, THEORETICALLY, REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT NOR THE GROUND ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENTS. HOWEVER, THE OPERATION OF COMBAT AIR-
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04253 02 OF 02 051728Z

CRAFT IS A MANPOWER-INTENSIVE PROCESS: THERE IS A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EQUIPMENTS AND THEIR INTENSITY AND HOURS OF OPERATION ON THE ONE HAND AND THE NUMBERS OF AIRMEN REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THESE ON THE OTHER. SIMILARLY, THERE IS A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TASKS DEFINED FOR COMBAT AIR FORCES IN WAR, AND THE NUMBERS, POSTURES, AND STATES OF READINESS OF THE COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN NORMAL PEACETIME CONDITIONS. ACTIVE OPERATIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY NATO

WITH THE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO UNITS IN PEACETIME. OVER THE YEARS, ANY SLACK IN MANPOWER HAS BEEN ELIMINATED BY ECONOMIC STRINGENCY AND WORK STUDY. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT MANPOWER CUT COULD BE TAKEN BY THE INDIGENOUS AIR FORCES IN THE NGA WITHOUT A DIRECT REACTION ON ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

A. NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE IN PEACE AND FOR WAR.

B. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS (I.E. COUNTER AIR VS. SUPPORT OF LAND BATTLE AND GROUND FORCES).

C. READINESS.

D. TARGETS.

E. HOURS OF OPERATION FOR QRA FORCES.

12. IN THE CASE OF STATIONED (CA-UK-US) AIR FORCES, IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY PRACTICABLE TO WITHDRAW AIR FORCE ELEMENTS FROM THE NGA , AND TO RETURN THEM IN EMERGENCY ON THE SAME SCALE WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME. THERE COULD BE, HOWEVER, SOME SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON THE ELEMENTS LISTED AT 13(C)-(E) ABOVE. SUCH EFFECTS COULD ONLY BE ASSESSED AFTER DETAILED EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHEICAL WITHDRAWALS OF SPECIFIED ELEMENTS.

13. IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED THAT, TO SUBJECT AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS WOULD NECESSARILY REDUCE AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY. AS STATED ABOVE, (PARA 10) THE EFFECTS OF SUCH REDUCTION IN AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE FULLY ASSESSED BEFORE ANY COMMIT-
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04253 02 OF 02 051728Z

MENT IS TAKEN TO ADDRESS AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS.

ANNEX A

ASSESSMENTS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER AT MID-1974

TABLE I

WARSAW PACT

USSR: CSFG 43,000
NGF 15,500
CGF 6,500
TOTAL 65,000

NSWP;
GDR 39,000
POLAND 61,000

CSSR 43,500
 TOTAL 143,500

GRAND TOTAL 208,500

NATO
 US 34,000
 NON-US BE 19,500
 FRG 111,000
 FR 500 (-)
 NL 20,000

SUB-TOTAL 151,000

CA 1,500
 UK 10,000

GRAND TOTAL 196,000

TABLE II ASSUMING REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES ONLY
 (LIMITED TO 10 PER CENT FOR NATO)

WARSAW PACT
 SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04253 02 OF 02 051728Z

REDUCTIONS TO COMMON CEILING WOULD BE 240,000

GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING TARGET

RESIDUAL TOTAL GROUND PLUS AIR MANPOWER 920,000

NATO

REDUCTIONS TO COMMON CEILING WOULD BE 79,000

GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING TARGET 712,000 (ABOUT)

RESIDUAL TOTAL GROUND PLUS AIR MANPOWER 908,000 DISPARITY 12,000

TABLE III ASSUMING CUMULATION GROUND/AIR MANPOWER AND REDUCTIONS
 IS APPLIED AT 10 PER CENT TO NATO GROSS TOTALS

	DISPARITY	
GROUND FORCES 952,000	791,000	161,000
GROUND & AIR 1,160,000	987,000	173,000

ASSUMING MAX.
 10 PER CENT
 REDUCTION
 FOR NATO 99,000

COMMON CEILING WOULD

NOT BE BELOW: 888,000

THIS WOULD ENTAIL
REDUCTIONS OF 272,000 99,000

END TEXT
MCAULIFFE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 AUG 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO04253
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740888/abbrywmq.tel
Line Count: 333
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) USNATO 4236; B) USNATO 4240; C) USNATO 4140
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <20-Jul-2001 by worrelsw, 3.4.X9>; RELEASED <14 MAY 2002 by golinofr>; APPROVED <15 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: WORKING GROUP CHAIRMAN'S DRAFT ON IMPLICATIONS OF REVISED DATA: AIR FORCE MANPOWER
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005